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Abstract: Fears of NAFTA in the United States were largely based on the belief that Mexicans 
and U.S. workers were substitutes: lowering barriers would allow competing products into the 
United States and investment outflows that would cause U.S. workers to lose their jobs to 
Mexico.  While this may have been true when NAFTA first went into effect, subsequent 
production specialization between Mexico and the United States may suggest that Mexican and 
U.S. workers are now complements.  In particular, NAFTA may have induced production 
restructuring throughout North America to generate integrated value chains in which workers in 
the three NAFTA countries work together to produce final products. This paper formally tests 
this idea using matched high-frequency U.S. and Mexican data.  The main results suggest that, 
during the NAFTA period, Mexican and U.S. production workers are complements, rather than 
substitutes, suggesting that both countries could benefit from viewing the economies as partners 
rather than competitors. Prior to NAFTA, U.S. and Mexican production workers were 
substitutes. 
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In 2018, the U.S, Canada, and Mexico renegotiated the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and offered the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as its 
successor. Much of the renegotiation was predicated on the idea that U.S. and Mexican workers 
compete for jobs. Indeed, over the last 25 years, U.S. manufacturing employment has been 
falling.  Figure 1a shows the evolution of U.S. manufacturing employment and output from the 
early 1980s to 2018.  The 2000-2010 decline is especially dramatic, renewing concern over the 
loss of relatively-well-paying manufacturing jobs.  One possible reason for the decline in 
manufacturing employment is competition from low wage countries (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 
2006) and specifically from Mexico.   Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) find that NAFTA 
significantly contributed to falling wages in the U.S. within localized labor markets during the 
1990-2000 period.   
It is not clear, however, that Mexico has been gaining relative to the United States. Figure 
1b shows that Mexican and U.S. manufacturing employment and output follow the same, not 
opposite, paths. In particular, both countries experienced rising manufacturing employment 
during the late 1990s, then falling during the 2000-2010 decade, and rising employment since 
2011. 
Common employment and output trends in the two countries are consistent with changes 
in global production technology—such as production fragmentation, outsourcing, and offshoring.  
Vertical specialization, outsourcing, and parts trade may increase domestic employment if the 
cost savings are great enough to affect output.  In other words, if the output effect is large 
enough, domestic employment would increase (Chen and Ku 2003).    The 1990-2000 period 
was the beginning of the NAFTA adjustment period for both countries because NAFTA went 
into effect in 1994.  Since 2011, manufacturing employment in both countries has been rising. 
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Outsourcing and vertical integration received significant attention shortly after NAFTA 
went into effect (Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1999, Hummels et al. 2001).  Feenstra and Hanson 
modeled countries (such as Mexico and the United States) producing a single product, which 
raises the possibility that domestic and foreign workers are complements, rather than substitutes.  
One implication of rising production fragmentation is rising two-way trade in intermediate 
goods.  Figure 2 shows that U.S. exports to Mexico and U.S. imports from Mexico move very 
closely together (correlation coefficient for the entire series is over 0.98) and increase their 
correlation over time and that the rate of increase in trade rises after 1994.  Sotomayor (2016) 
shows that U.S.-Mexican trade is increasingly characterized by vertical specialization. 
Most previous studies focus on the role of foreign investment (usually by 
multinationals).1 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) focus on the role of foreign investment in 
Mexico’s maquiladora sector2 in its northern border region using the outsourcing model 
mentioned above.  Vertical integration does not, however, necessarily require foreign direct 
investment.  Foreign producers may independently design parts and products that can be used as 
inputs into production in other countries.  This structure is known as global value chains (e.g. 
Gereffi 1999,2014). Falling trade barriers therefore potentially contribute to expanding trade in 
final, intermediate, and capital goods that facilitate vertical integration and global value chains.   
The restructuring that took place following Mexico’s liberalization in the 1980s (Hanson 
1996) went beyond the foreign direct investment that characterized Mexico’s maquiladora sector.   
Therefore, this paper asks whether Mexican manufacturing workers generally are complements 
                                                 
1 For example, see Brainard and Riker (1997a,b)  
2 Mexico’s maquiladora sector (sometimes referred to as the in-bond program) included assembly plants along 
Mexico’s northern border that were allowed to effectively import parts duty-free for assembly in Mexico and then 
re-export to the United States.  Mexico then paid tariffs only on value added within Mexico.  NAFTA effectively 
extended the maquiladora program to the rest of the country, creating the potential for a national restructuring of 
production into the North American value chain. 
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or substitutes for U.S. workers.  As such, this paper differs from past work because it abstracts 
from the direct role of outsourcing per se and focuses on manufacturing more generally.  The 
main idea is that outsourcing plays an important, but not unique, role in labor market 
complementarities.   
Estimating whether U.S. and Mexican workers are complements or substitutes is 
important for several reasons.  The U.S. renegotiation and current consideration of the USMCA 
highlight the debate as to whether the U.S. and Mexico are competitors or partners.  The 
education distribution of each country in 1994, shown in Figure 3, suggests that, at least in terms 
of skills, the United States and Mexico are natural complements.  The differences in skills 
motivates trade in neoclassical trade models (e.g. the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem) and models of 
vertical investment.  Feenstra and Hanson (1997) illustrate foreign direct investment's role in 
linking the U.S. and Mexico’s northern border region and Robertson (2000) shows that the labor 
markets of the U.S. and Mexico are closely integrated.  Nevertheless, several papers find that 
immigrants to the United States and U.S. workers are substitutes (Borjas 1987, 2003)3 and 
popular antipathy towards NAFTA often centered on job loss to Mexico.   
 The remainder of the paper unfolds in three additional sections.  The next section 
contains the estimation approach and results. Section three describes the data and section four 
presents the results. In this section, we also examine the robustness of the results by considering 
alternative measures of wages, specifications, and analyzing the relationship of U.S. production 
workers and Mexican maquiladora workers.  The final section concludes. 
                                                 
3 Although other studies, notably in other countries, find that migrants and natives are complements.  See Dolado et 
al. (1996), Dorantes and Huang (1997), Gavosto et al. (1999), Greenwood and Hunt (1995) and Kim (2006). 
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Theoretic Foundation and Empirical Approach 
While the Heckscher-Ohlin model suggests that production in two trading countries is 
separate and countries trade final goods, international production fragmentation implies that 
North America can be thought of as a single production unit.  Papers that focus on production 
fragmentation, such as Feenstra and Hanson (1996,1997, 1999) often model production with a 
single international production function.  The model here differs from their work because we 
model different worker types explicitly in a labor demand framework that is more general than 
their Ricardian-task model. 
Begin by considering an industry i at time t with a simple production function that uses 
three kinds of labor: U.S. production workers (Uus), Mexican nonproduction workers (Smx), and 
Mexican production workers (Umx).4  Mexican and U.S. workers enter into a single production 
function.   Representing output as Y,  
 ( ), ,us mx mxit it it itY F U S U= . (1) 
For the purposes of focusing on labor demand, it is convenient to focus on the cost function.  The 
cost function approach requires a decision about exogeneity. We can either assume that 
quantities or wages are taken to be exogenous for the unit of observation.  When dealing with 
relatively small industrial units (disaggregated industries), the general consensus (Hamermesh 
1993) is that the appropriate assumption is that wages are considered exogenous.  Therefore, the 
corresponding cost function can be represented as  
 , , ,( , , , )us u mx s mx uit it it itC G w w w Y= . (2) 
                                                 
4 Here we use U for production workers and S for nonproduction workers in reference to early studies that used 
these categories to represent unskilled workers and skilled workers.  
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Hamermesh (1993) describes three ways to estimate labor demand equations.  We opt for 
the second: estimating the derivatives of the cost function directly.  Applying Shepard's lemma to 
(2) generates a system of three equations (one for each of the relevant factors) in which L 
represents employment. 
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In this structure, we expect that the own-price effect is negative ( 1 2 30, 0, 0α β γ< < < ).  That is, 
we expect that the labor demand curves are downward sloping.  The magnitude of these 
coefficients reveal how sensitive labor demand of each factor is to changes in its own wage. 
The remaining estimated coefficients are the cross-price elasticities. The question 
presented by this paper – whether U.S. and Mexican workers are complements or substitutes – is 
answered by the signs of the 2 3 1 3 1 2, , , , ,  and α α β β γ γ  coefficients.  The signs of these estimates 
indicate whether or not factors are p-complements or p-substitutes.  Positive (negative) 
coefficients suggest that increasing the wage of a factor on the right-hand side increases 
(reduces) the demand of the dependent factor on the left-hand side, which means that the factors 
are p-substitutes (complements). For example, a positive 3α  coefficient implies that U.S. and 
Mexican production workers are substitutes, while a negative 3α  coefficient implies that U.S. 
and Mexican production workers are complements. 
 The system in equation (3) includes Mexican industrial output.5  The resulting 
coefficients are therefore interpreted as the constant-output substitution elasticities.  Intuitively, 
these estimates tell us something about the curvature of the isoquant, and therefore we generally 
                                                 
5 The value of production in real (1990) pesos. 
6 
 
expect that the factors are more likely to be substitutes.  In practice, however, the output effect 
may be significant.  That is, a fall in the price of one factor lowers the firm's total cost, and 
therefore may induce an expansion in output that increases the employment of any or all of the 
factors.  Therefore, Hamermesh (1993) suggests that the total effect of factor price changes may 
be estimated by simply dropping the output terms from the system in (3), so that, alternatively, 
we may estimate 
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In the next section, we describe the data used to estimate (3) and (4). Data 
The data combine Mexico’s Monthly Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Mensual, or 
EIM) with U.S. Current Employment Statistics surveys.  The Mexican National Institute for 
Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (Instituto Nactional de Estadística, Geografia, e 
Informatica, or INEGI) conducts the survey.  Aggregated data for 205 industries are available on 
the internet6 and cover the 2007-2017 period.  The survey is designed to cover 80% of Mexican 
manufacturing production.  The survey design is based in the Mexican Industrial Census, which 
is taken every five years.  For the period covered in this paper, the survey covers about 60007 
establishments.  The survey excludes firms in the maquiladora industry, basic petrochemicals, 
petroleum refining, and firms with fifteen or fewer employees (microindustria).  Variables 
include employment, hours, and wages for production (obreros) and nonproduction (empleados) 
workers, as well as the value of production and sales.   
                                                 
6 See Banco de Información Económica at http://www.inegi.gob.mx. 
7 Over the sample period, the survey covers between 5,587 and 6,884 establishments.  
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The U.S. Current Employment Statistics program covers about 300,000 employer units 
for a coverage of over 35% of total payroll employment.  The survey is conducted by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics in cooperation with individual states.  The data include average hourly 
wages and employment for production workers, but do not include value of production or 
earnings of nonproduction workers.  As a result, monthly production value is not available at the 
industry level.8  Hours and earnings data are available for about 850 industries, although the 
number of industries with complete data is much smaller. 
The Mexican and the U.S. data are matched industry-by-industry at the most detailed 
level possible.  30 industries were successfully matched at various levels of aggregation.  The 
matched 4-digit industries, NAICS codes, and English descriptions are listed in the Appendix.  
The level of aggregation ranges from 3 to 5 digit NAICS, with 23 industries matched at the 3-
digit level, 88 industries matched at the 4-digit level, and 183 matched at the 5-digit level. 
 Summary Statistics  
Total manufacturing employment in the United States is in the neighborhood of twelve 
million workers.  In Mexico, total manufacturing employment is in the neighborhood of three 
million workers.  Mexicans tend to work more hours per week.  As such, we measure 
employment in mean monthly hours by industry.  Mexican mean monthly hours worked is about 
one third of U.S. mean monthly hours worked. 
Table 2 contains summary statistics on average hourly wages for U.S. and Mexican 
production workers and Mexican nonproduction workers. The means are listed by year from 
                                                 
8 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board releases monthly production indices at the industry level.  
These indices are not usually direct measures of output.  Instead, for much of manufacturing, the output indices are 
constructed functions of the Current Employment Statistics employment data. 
8 
 
2007 to 2017. Real wages are calculated using the domestic consumer price index for each 
country, and all currency is set to a base year of 2017 USD.  
There is no clear trend in average U.S. hourly wages from 2007 to 2017. U.S. supervisor 
wages range from US$36.44 in 2012 to US$39.19 in 2017. U.S. non-supervisor wages range 
from US$19.88 in 2014 to US$20.55 in both 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, real dollar-
valued Mexican wages appear to decline over time. Mexican non-supervisor wages range from 
US$1.75 in 2017 to US$2.61 in 2007, and Mexican supervisor wages range from US$4.40 in 
2017 to US$6.68 in 2007. None of the trends, however, are statistically significant.   
 Estimation issues  
Several estimations issues arise with this approach.  First, the errors of the system are 
probably correlated.  Therefore, Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach is 
appropriate.  Second, to control for possible fixed effects in our panel, estimates of equation (4) 
include industry-specific fixed effects.   
Third, the labor demand theory technically implies symmetry across the three equations.  
Specifically, theoretic-imposed symmetry implies that 2 1 3 1 2 3, ,  and α β α γ γ β= = = . The results 
presented below include those with the symmetry restriction imposed during estimation.  The 
results without symmetry are discussed in the text in the robustness section and provided in an 
estimation appendix. 
Fourth, to compare U.S. and Mexican wages, we transform Mexican peso-valued wages 
into U.S. dollar wages using the current exchange rate and the U.S. consumer price index (base 
year 2017).   Adjusting with the exchange rate may be problematic for several reasons.  First, the 
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peso may not fully adjust to offset differences in inflation rates.9  Second, Mexican non-maquila 
producers may make decisions based on pesos, while U.S. producers probably do not.  The 
summary statistics in Table 2 and the main results use dollar-valued wages, and estimates using 
Mexican compensation measured in pesos are very similar.  Results 
Table 2 contains the results for the estimates of the system in (3) using aggregate 
manufacturing data for the 2007-2017 period.  The results include SUR estimation with cross-
equation symmetry imposed.  The first three columns therefore include the results from three 
simultaneously-estimated equations. There are several important results from Table 2.  The first 
is that the own-price effects (the diagonal terms starting from the first estimated coefficient in the 
upper left corner) are all negative and significant, as expected.  The results suggest that labor 
demand in the United States is more elastic than labor demand in Mexico.  The second result is 
that nonproduction workers are substitutes for both kinds of production workers, which also is 
intuitive.  That is, the coefficients involving Mexican nonproduction workers and the two 
production workers are positive.   
In terms of the question posed by this paper, however, the main result is in the upper right 
corner of each set of three columns.  The negative estimate of the relationship between U.S. 
production workers and Mexican production workers suggests that the U.S. and Mexican 
production workers are complements.  These results are consistent with the results shown in 
Figures 1a and 1b that show that employment generally moves in similar ways in the two 
countries rather than falling in the United States and rising in Mexico.   
                                                 
9 Robertson, Kumar, and Dutkowsky (2009), however, find that purchasing power parity, or the adjustment of prices 
and exchange rates necessary to keep product prices comparable across countries, is stronger as products become 
more precisely identified in Mexico and the United States (i.e. disaggregated products). 
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The second set of three columns in Table 2 contains the results from estimating the 
system in equation (4): the total effect estimates that exclude output.  The results similar in 
several important ways.  The own-price effects are again negative and the coefficients for the 
nonproduction and production workers again suggest that these worker types are substitutes.  The 
U.S. and Mexican production workers, however, are estimated to be complements (with an 
estimated coefficient that is larger in absolute value).  Excluding output reduces the estimated R-
squared value, but overall the equations are strongly consistent with theory. The remainder of the 
paper explores the robustness of this basic result. Robustness  
There are several ways in which to explore the robustness of the main results.  This 
section contains results from relaxing the symmetry assumption, different aggregation levels, 
different industries, and different time periods. Relaxing Symmetry 
Estimates of systems (3) and (4) without imposing symmetry are found in Appendix 
Table 2a.  The own-price effects are all negative and five of the six are statistically significant.  
The U.S. and Mexican production worker own-price effects are statistically significant and 
greater than one.  Without imposing symmetry, the U.S. responsiveness to Mexican production-
worker wages estimate is 0.-342, while the Mexican production worker responsiveness to the 
U.S. production worker wage is -2.110.  These estimates suggest that Mexican employment is 
both elastic and much more responsive to the changes in the U.S. production worker wage.   In 
other words, these results suggest that the U.S. wages drive Mexican employment much more 
(by more than a factor of six) than Mexican wages drive U.S. employment.  These results are 
consistent with the United States being the driving force of North American global value chains 
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and that labor demand in Mexico may take the U.S. shocks as exogenous (which helps with our 
identification). 
The difference between the U.S. and Mexican production worker estimates is statistically 
significant (a t-test rejects the null that the coefficients are equal).  The t-test results for the pair-
wise symmetry restrictions are found in Appendix Table 2b.  The null that the Mexican 
production and nonproduction worker coefficients are the same is not rejected (with coefficients 
of 0.092 and 0.622).  Although the null that they coefficients are equal is rejected for other pairs, 
we proceed with the imposed symmetry constraints because they are mandated by theory. 
 Aggregation levels  
If industries are linked through outsourcing or production fragmentation, then we might 
expect that the results of complementarity might be starker as we disaggregate from overall 
manufacturing.  Table 3 shows the results of estimating (4) using matched industries aggregated 
at the 4-digit level.  As earlier, the own-price effects are negative and significant, and the 
production-nonproduction coefficients are positive.  The U.S. and Mexican production worker 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant and the estimate is more precisely measured 
than in Table 2.  The overall R-squared estimates are also very high.   
Results for the 3-digit and 5-digit industry levels are available upon request, but the 
results are similar.  In particular, at the 5-digit level, the estimate of complementarity between 
U.S. and Mexican production workers is -0.044 (significant at the 1% level).  The smaller result 
at the 5-digit level than the 4-digit level (which, in turn, is smaller than the estimate at the 1-digit 
level) might suggest that there is integration across narrowly-defined industries.  The results at 
the 3-digit level still imply complementarity (i.e. the estimated coefficient is negative), but is 
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only marginally significant (p-value of just over 10%).  The relatively large standard errors at the 
3-digit level may imply heterogeneity across industries, which we explore in the next section. 
 Industries  
 Assuming that vertical integration is predominantly within in the same industry, it is 
interesting to consider estimates of complementarity for specific industries.  In this section, we 
consider the results for apparel, food products, and the automobile industry. Apparel 
Apparel is a particularly important industry in the global value chain literature (Robertson 
et al. (2009) and was one of the early industries to restructure vertically between Mexico and the 
United States (Bair 2002).   Apparel is also a labor-intensive industry and therefore often in the 
popular spotlight as one whose jobs are especially sensitive to imports and international 
competition. Since NAFTA, however, the industry has become an example of vertical 
integration, with Mexican assembly plants using U.S. designs and fabrics.  In the early 2000s 
competition with China reduced employment in Mexico, but China’s wage growth and slowing 
exports have corresponded to a resurgence of Mexican apparel production.  
Table 5a contains the results from estimating (4) for just the apparel industry.  The own-
price effects are again negative and significant, and the results imply that production and 
nonproduction workers are substitutes.  The estimates also imply that that U.S. and Mexican 
production workers are complements.  The apparel estimates contrast with previous estimates in 
that the estimate of complementarity is not estimated as precisely, which may reflect the 
structure of the integration between the countries. That is, it may be that Mexico is producing 
apparel from U.S. textile goods, and within apparel there may be less room for complementarity 





 Vertical integration in U.S. food manufacturing industries is not new (Livesay and Porter 
1969), but current estimates of the degree of vertical integration in the U.S. food products 
industry suggest that the degree of vertical integration is quite low (Bhuyan 2005).  Table 5b 
contains the results for the food products industry (311).  The results are consistent in some ways 
with earlier tables.  In particular, the own-price effects are negative, although statistically 
significant for two of the three factors.  The other coefficients, however, flip signs.  In particular, 
production and nonproduction workers are now estimated to be complements, and U.S. and 
Mexican production workers are estimated to be substitutes.  In other words, Table 5b shows that 
the complementarity result from other tables is not simply an artifact of the estimation approach. 
Note that this result does not suggest that there is no vertical integration in agricultural industries 
(some agricultural industries have significant vertical integration), but overall U.S. and Mexican 
production workers are not complements.   Automobiles 
The global automobile industry is one of the most significant examples of vertically-
structured value chains (Stugeon, Van Biesebroeck, and Gereffi 2008) and has received 
considerable attention for innovation and structure (Novak and Stern 2007, Hashmi and Van 
Biesebroeck 2010, Van Biesebroeck 2006).  Vertical integration in the North American 
automobile industry advanced considerably with the Mexican maquiladora program that attracted 
investment in light assembly of automobile parts (especially wiring harnesses) along Mexico’s 
Northern border.  Mexico moved from the third largest supplier to the United States of 
automobile parts in 1990 to first by 2005 (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck 2010).   
Table 5c shows two sets of results for the automobile industry.  The three columns show 
the results of estimating (4), just as in previous tables.   Again, the own-price effects are negative 
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and significant.  They also imply that demand for U.S. production workers is much more elastic 
than the demand for Mexican workers in the automobile industry.  The results also suggest that 
that the production workers are complements, but only weakly.  This result seems surprising for 
a highly vertical industry so closely integrated with the United States. Sturgeon and Van 
Biesenbroeck (2010) suggest that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 hit the U.S. automobile 
industry especially hard – more so than in any other U.S. industry other than banking and 
finance.  Furthermore, they show that the crisis affected the two countries asymmetricially.  In 
particular, during the crisis the U.S. growth was -17.58%, while Mexico only contracted 4.44%. 
Based on these results, the second set of results in Table 5c show the results with an 
additional control for the financial crisis.  The results show that the U.S. demand becomes less 
elastic (which is intuitive), but the Mexican own-price effects are nearly identical.  In terms of 
complementarity, the results with the crisis control show that the complementarity result is 
statistically significant.  These results imply that U.S. and Mexican automobile workers outside 
of Mexico’s maquiladora industry are working together in a common value chain rather than 
competing for jobs.  
 Post-NAFTA to current survey: 1994-2005 
The sensitivity of the automobile industry to the financial crisis, as well as the gradual 
phase-in of the provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, raise the question about 
whether these results are robust to other time periods.  Survey changes within Mexico make 
earlier datasets difficult to compare (and merge) directly with the current data, but data do exist 
for the time period beginning with the implementation of NAFTA and 2005. The source of these 
data are the same Mexican surveys as the 2007-2017 data (Mexico’s Monthly Industrial Survey).  
15 
 
To carry out the analysis for the earlier period, the earlier data are again matched with the U.S. 
Current Employment Statistics surveys and used to estimate (4). 
Table 6 contains summary statistics. Real wages are calculated using the domestic 
consumer price index for each country. All currency is set to a base value of 1990 USD. The 
dataset has 10,872 observations across all industry aggregation levels. The data cover 80 
different industries. On average, the wages of American white-collar workers, Mexican white-
collar workers, and Mexican blue-collar workers went up over this 12 year period. Employment 
for white-collar workers in both the United States and Mexico went down slightly in this period, 
but employment for Mexican blue-collar workers stayed about the same.  
The constrained results for both the constant output and total effect are presented in Table 
7.  Many of the results are similar to the 1987-2004 data.  The own price effects are negative and 
are similar to the magnitudes suggested by Hamermesh (1993).  The output effects are also all 
positive.  The results for Mexican nonproduction workers and production workers are again 
positive.  The main result, however, is that Mexican production workers and U.S. production 
workers are complements, and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant.  The 
coefficient magnitudes are smaller than those in Table 2. While the difference between Table 2 
and Table 7 are not statistically significant, the smaller magnitudes are consistent with the idea 
that during this period both economies were going through the restructuring process.  That is, 
Mexico was becoming integrated into the North American value chain beyond the maquiladora 
sector.  This result emerges with and without including the value of production.  In fact, the 






The finding that the estimated coefficients that measure the degree of complementarity 
between U.S. and Mexican production workers was smaller in the 1994-2005 period than in the 
2007-2018 period raises the question of the degree of complementarity prior to NAFTA.  The 
Mexican Monthly Industrial Census was revised in 1993.  In the revision, the sample of 
industries changed to accommodate a new industrial classification system.  Prior to the change, 
another sample of the EIM guided Mexican manufacturing statistics.  That is, data exist from the 
pre-NAFTA period but are not strictly comparable to the later two samples.  The earlier sample 
covered 129 industries and 3,172 manufacturing firms in 1987.  The data represent a balanced 
panel of 129 industries over the period 1987-1994.  
To analyze the 1987-2004 period, the same matching exercise combines the Mexican 
data with the U.S. data described earlier using the same 80 industries described in Appendix 1.  
The combined data are then applied to the same estimation equations as the later data set.  Table 
8 contains data from the 1987-1994 survey. Real wages are calculated using the domestic 
consumer price index for each country. All currency is set to a base of 1990 USD. 
Table 9 contains the results for the 1987-1994 period with the symmetry restriction 
imposed.  Some of the features of Table 9 are consistent with earlier tables. Specifically, all of 
the own-price effects are negative and are within the range suggested by Hamermesh (1993).  
Two key differences emerge.  The first is that nonproduction and production workers are now 
estimated as complements.   The main difference, however, is that the pattern of 
complementarity that emerge in the 1994-2005 and 2007-2017 periods reverses.  Table 9 
suggests that in the 1987-1994 period, U.S. production workers were substitutes with Mexican 
production workers.  Differences in the sample, or differences in the sample period (or both), 
could explain the differences in the results.  That said, however, it is interesting that the results 
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suggest that, prior to NAFTA, U.S. and Mexican production workers outside of the Mexican 
maquiladora sector are estimated to be substitutes and that NAFTA may have contributed to a 
restructuring of North American production into a single production unit. 
 Conclusions 
As stated in the preamble, NAFTA’s goals included increasing trade, investment, and 
integration between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  As such, NAFTA had the potential 
to increase labor market integration in North America by increasing trade and foreign direct 
investment. While other papers have considered complementarities of North American workers 
in terms of migration and foreign directly investment, few, if any, papers have focused on trade's 
role in facilitating complementarity or substitutability in North American labor markets outside 
of Mexico’s maquiladora sector. This is surprising, given the fact that one of the key reasons for 
popular resistance of NAFTA was the popular belief that Mexican workers are substitutes for 
U.S. workers.  That is, it was widely believed that free trade with relatively low-wage Mexico 
would induce displacement of U.S. workers as cheaper products arrived from the south.  
There are many obvious examples of U.S. and Mexican communities that have been 
adversely affected by trade.  Current literature shows that adjustment to changes in trade policy 
and trade flows is extremely costly and that specific markets were adversely affected by rising 
trade flows from developing countries (e.g. Artuc, McLaren, and Chaudhuri 2010, and Hakobyan 
and McLaren 2016).  The result of this painful adjustment was a restructuring of North American 
production into value chains that might make Mexican workers complements with U.S. workers 
rather than substitutes.  Whether U.S. and Mexican workers are complements or substitutes is the 
18 
 
question this paper asks.  The main results suggest that U.S. and Mexican workers are currently 
complements and not substitutes.  
In addition, this paper evaluates whether or not Mexican and U.S. workers are 
complements or substitutes before and after the NAFTA period.  The main results indicate that, 
during the NAFTA period, U.S. and Mexican production workers are complements, while U.S. 
production and Mexican nonproduction workers are substitutes. This has significant implications 
for North American labor market integration.  The United States and Mexico seem to act more 
like a single production unit rather than competing units.  One may conclude from this result 
that, while some job displacement is inevitable as economies adjust, North American economic 
interests are closely tied and that policy makers would do well to think of Mexico as an 
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Figure 1b: Mexican Manufacturing Employment and Manufacturing Output 
 
 
Notes: U.S. Employment and output data come from the FRED at the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank.  See https://fred.stlouisfed.org.  Mexican employment 
and output data come from INEGI and are compiled by INEGI and the authors 
from several sources, including the Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México, 
the Encuesta Industrial Mensual, and the Encuesta Industrial Anual. All four 









































Figure 2: Change in total trade between US and Mexico 
 
 
Notes: Data represent U.S. trade in goods with Mexico and come from 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html#2018.  As noted on that page, all figures 
are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise 
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Figure 3: 1994 U.S. and Mexico Education Levels 
 
Notes: Education levels are sorted into 12 categories.  Mexican data are from the 1994 Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo Urbano.  U.S. data are from the 1994 Monthly Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population 
Surveys.  Education levels are: 1 = Less Than 1st Grade , 2 = 1st,2nd,3rd Or 4th Grade, 3 = 5th Or 6th Grade, 4 = 
7th Or 8th Grade, 5= 9th Grade, 6= 10th, 11th, and 12th  Grade (no diploma), 7 =  High School Grad-Diploma Or 
Equiv (GED), 8 Some College But No Degree, 9 = Associate Degree-Occupational/Vocational or Associate Deg.-
Academic Program, 10 = Bachelor's Degree(ex:ba,ab,bs), 11 = Master's(ex:MA,MS,MEng,MEd,MSW), 12 = 



















Summary Statistics for the 2007-2017 dataset 
 
Year US production 
hourly wage 





2007 20.25 6.69 2.64 
2008 20.00 6.54 2.58 
2009 20.58 5.72 2.24 
2010 20.58 6.09 2.39 
2011 20.23 6.14 2.40 
2012 19.99 5.89 2.32 
2013 19.98 6.18 2.40 
2014 19.97 6.08 2.36 
2015 20.36 5.29 2.06 
2016 20.59 4.66 1.80 
2017 20.55 4.54 1.77 
Notes: Wages are the average real dollar-valued hourly wage across the 
entire sample.  Mexican wage values are converted with the nominal 
exchange rate and the U.S. consumer price index (CPI).  U.S. values are 





SUR Results for the 2007-2017 data  
Aggregate Manufacturing 
 




























              
US Blue Collar Wages -0.789* 0.295*** -0.291*** -0.737** 0.421*** -0.368*** 
 (0.417) (0.090) (0.108) (0.322) (0.076) (0.082) 
Mexican White-Collar Wages 0.295*** -0.456*** 0.266*** 0.421*** -0.431*** 0.312*** 
 (0.090) (0.062) (0.070) (0.076) (0.064) (0.070) 
Mexican Blue-Collar Wages -0.291*** 0.266*** -0.689*** -0.368*** 0.312*** -0.614*** 
 (0.108) (0.070) (0.082) (0.082) (0.070) (0.077) 
Output 1.644* 1.857*** 3.222***    
 (0.883) (0.388) (0.592)    
Constant 3.971 4.443 -4.167 17.218*** 19.301*** 22.499*** 
 (8.092) (3.267) (4.922) (0.995) (0.225) (0.247) 
       
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.163 0.345 0.411 0.121 0.177 0.289 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hours are the monthly hours and wages are 
the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values are converted with the nominal exchange rate and the U.S. CPI.  






Table 3: SUR Results for the 2007-2017 data  
4-digit Industries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 




Mexican Blue-Collar Workers 
Hours 
        
US Blue Collar Wages -0.065* 0.100*** -0.070*** 
 (0.034) (0.010) (0.011) 
Mexican White-Collar Wages 0.100*** -0.209*** 0.025*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) 
Mexican Blue-Collar Wages -0.070*** 0.025*** -0.245*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) 
Output 0.949*** 3.229*** 3.690*** 
 (0.068) (0.063) (0.068) 
Constant 8.088*** 6.323*** 7.060*** 
 (0.200) (0.159) (0.170) 
    
Observations 5,538 5,538 5,538 
R-squared 0.968 0.992 0.991 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All estimation contains industry fixed effects. 
Hours are the monthly hours and wages are the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values are converted with 







 Table 5a: Industry Specific Results 
Apparel 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 






        
US Blue Collar Wages -1.287*** 0.339*** -0.139* 
 (0.235) (0.072) (0.072) 
Mexican White-Collar Wages 0.339*** -0.356*** 0.206*** 
 (0.072) (0.054) (0.050) 
Mexican Blue-Collar Wages -0.139* 0.206*** -0.428*** 
 (0.072) (0.050) (0.050) 
Output 7.110*** 7.229*** 8.144*** 
 (0.920) (0.839) (0.670) 
Constant -5.040** -3.793* -3.064* 
 (2.525) (2.101) (1.682) 
    
Observations 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.542 0.365 0.457 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Apparel industry is 
represented by NAICS 315. Hours are the monthly hours and wages are the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  
Mexican values are converted with the nominal exchange rate and the U.S. CPI.  U.S. values are converted 






Table 5b: Industry Specific Results 
Food Products 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 






        
US Blue Collar Wages -0.462* -0.205*** 0.135** 
 (0.237) (0.061) (0.058) 
Mexican White-Collar Wages -0.205*** -0.106*** -0.020 
 (0.061) (0.035) (0.035) 
Mexican Blue-Collar Wages 0.135** -0.020 -0.054 
 (0.058) (0.035) (0.036) 
Output -2.808*** 1.250*** 0.529 
 (0.753) (0.379) (0.336) 
Constant 21.408*** 14.649*** 16.699*** 
 (2.320) (1.070) (0.962) 
    
Observations 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.137 0.259 0.235 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Food industry is represented by 
NAICS 311.. Hours are the monthly hours and wages are the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values 









Table 5c: Industry Specific Results 
Automobiles 


























              
US Blue Collar 
Wages -1.208*** 0.260*** -0.023 -0.731*** 0.316*** -0.228*** 
 (0.266) (0.056) (0.061) (0.211) (0.055) (0.057) 
Mexican 
White-Collar 
Wages 0.260*** -0.511*** 0.110* 0.316*** -0.504*** 0.021 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.050) (0.052) 
Mexican Blue-
Collar Wages -0.023 0.110* -0.477*** -0.228*** 0.021 -0.418*** 
 (0.061) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) (0.052) (0.058) 
Output 1.444** 7.484*** 12.524*** 5.473*** 9.409*** 13.196*** 
 (0.656) (0.537) (0.533) (0.622) (0.643) (0.613) 
Crisis    0.198*** 0.116*** 0.070*** 
    (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) 
Constant 11.701*** -3.952** -15.964*** -0.987 -9.426*** -17.037*** 
 (2.525) (1.599) (1.594) (2.229) (1.854) (1.777) 
       
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.439 0.797 0.891 0.650 0.821 0.906 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The automobile industry is represented 
by NAICS 336. Hours are the monthly hours and wages are the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values 
























1994 11.00 6.44 2.24 115.07 4.62 10.28 
1995 10.94 4.06 1.39 116.93 4.30 9.34 
1996 10.95 4.22 1.43 116.24 4.32 9.71 
1997 11.01 5.10 1.66 117.01 4.49 10.32 
1998 11.09 5.04 1.73 117.11 4.68 10.76 
1999 11.15 5.70 1.99 115.27 4.79 10.81 
2000 11.16 6.61 2.36 114.70 4.84 10.99 
2001 11.17 7.46 2.68 107.59 4.74 10.41 
2002 11.39 7.62 2,78 98.85 4.55 9.85 
2003 11.43 7.11 2.65 93.75 4.54 9.52 
2004 11.46 7.01 2.66 92.46 4.45 9.27 
2005 11.42 7.26 2.74 92.04 4.39 9.18 
Notes: Mexican data are from the Mexican Encuesta Industrial Mensual and the U.S. data are 
from the U.S. Current Employment Statistics.  Wages are in real U.S. dollars per hour.  
Employment are survey sample sizes measured in thousands of workers. In the column headings, 






Table 7: SUR Results for 1994-2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
























              
US Blue Collar Wages -0.232*** 0.009*** -0.046*** -0.238*** 0.013*** -0.040*** 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mexican White-Collar 
Wages 0.009*** -0.217*** 0.003 0.013*** -0.151*** 0.075*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Mexican Blue-Collar 
Wages -0.046*** 0.003 -0.261*** -0.040*** 0.075*** -0.143*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Output 0.024*** 0.333*** 0.453***    
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)    
Constant 3.314*** 3.533*** 3.226*** 3.606*** 7.398*** 8.517*** 
 (0.032) (0.060) (0.061) (0.026) (0.017) (0.018) 
       
Observations 9,900 9,900 9,900 9,900 9,900 9,900 
R-squared 0.940 0.981 0.978 0.939 0.972 0.960 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimation contains industry fixed effects. 
Hours are the monthly hours and wages are the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values are converted with 




















1987 11.47 1.98 0.98 91.78 3.22 7.49 
1988 11.33 2.64 1.22 94.22 3.20 7.45 
1989 11.10 3.25 1.37 94.47 3.25 7.71 
1990 11.14 3.84 1.50 116.37 3.25 7.74 
1991 11.04 4.70 1.77 111.88 3.25 7.61 
1992 11.01 5.91 2.13 110.61 3.16 7.31 
1993 10.98 6.90 2.42 111.06 2.98 6.73 
1994 11.00 7.03 2.44 113.63 2.82 6.43 
 
Notes: Mexican data are from the Mexican Encuesta Industrial Mensual and the U.S. data are 
from the U.S. Current Employment Statistics.  Wages are in real U.S. dollars per hour.  
Employment are survey sample sizes measured in thousands of workers. In the column headings, 
P represents production workers and NP represents nonproduction workers. The strong growth in 






Table 9: SUR Results for 1987-1994 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
VARIABLES 





















              
American White-Collar Workers -0.203*** -0.020*** 0.019*** -0.206*** -0.018*** 0  
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (  
Mexican White-Collar Workers -0.020*** -0.307*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.286*** 0  
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (  
Mexican Blue-Collar Workers 0.019*** -0.019*** -0.381*** 0.020*** 0.014** -0  
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (  
Output 0.009*** 0.181*** 0.227***    
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.009)    
Constant 3.485*** 5.078*** 5.302*** 3.591*** 7.095*** 7  
 (0.054) (0.093) (0.099) (0.041) (0.021) (  
       
Observations 4,715 4,715 4,715 4,715 4,715  
R-squared 0.954 0.973 0.973 0.954 0.971  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimation contains industry fixed effects. Hours are the 
monthly hours and wages are the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values are converted with the nominal exchange rate an   






Industry List – 4 digit NAICs codes 
US 
 
Industry Name MX 
 3111 Animal food 3111 
3112 Grain and oilseed milling 3112 
3113 Sugar and confectionery products 3113 
3114 Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty 3114 
3115 Dairy products 3115 
3116 Animal slaughtering and processing 3116 
3117 Seafood product preparation and packaging 3117 
3118 Bakeries and tortilla manufacturing 3118 
3119 Other food products 3119 
3121 Beverages 3121 
3122 Other miscellaneous nondurable goods 
 
3122 
3131 Fiber, yarn, and thread mills 3131 
3132 Fabric mills 3132 
3133 Textile and fabric finishing mills 3133 
3141 Textile furnishings mills 3141 
3149 Other textile product mills 3149 
3151 All other apparel manufacturing 3151 
3152 Cut and sew apparel 3152 
3159 All other apparel manufacturing 3159 
3211 Sawmills and wood preservation 3211 
3212 Plywood and engineered wood products 3212 
3219 Other wood products 3219 
3221 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 3221 
3222 Converted paper products 3222 
3251 Basic chemicals 3251 
3252 Resin, rubber, and artificial fibers 3252 
3253 Agricultural chemicals 3253 
3254 Pharmaceuticals and medicines 3254 
3255 Paints, coatings, and adhesives 3255 
3256 Soaps, cleaning compounds, and toiletries 3256 
3259 Other chemical products and preparations 3259 
3261 Plastics products 3261 
3262 Rubber products 3262 
3271 Clay products and refractories 3271 
3272 Glass and glass products 3272 
3273 Cement and concrete products 3273 
3274 Lime, gypsum, and other nonmetallic mineral 
 
3274 
3279 Lime, gypsum, and other nonmetallic mineral 
 
3279 
3311 Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy production 3311 
3312 Steel products from purchased steel 3312 
3313 Alumina and aluminum production 3313 
36 
 
3314 Other nonferrous metal production 3314 
3315 Foundries 3315 
3321 Forging and stamping 3321 
3322 Cutlery and hand tools 3322 
3323 Architectural and structural metals 3323 
3324 Boilers, tanks, and shipping containers 3324 
3325 Hardware, spring, and wire products 3325 
3326 Hardware, spring, and wire products 3326 
3327 Machine shops and threaded products 3327 
3328 Coating, engraving, and heat treating metals 3328 
3329 Other fabricated metal products 3329 
3331 Agricultural, construction, and mining machinery 3331 
3332 Industrial machinery 3332 
3333 Commercial and service industry machinery 3333 
3334 HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment 3334 
3335 Metalworking machinery 3335 
3336 Turbine and power transmission equipment 3336 
3339 Other general purpose machinery 3339 
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment 3341 
3342 Communications equipment 3342 
3343 Miscellaneous computer and electronic products 3343 
3344 Semiconductors and electronic components 3344 
3345 Electronic instruments 3345 
3346 Miscellaneous computer and electronic products 3346 
3351 Electric lighting equipment 3351 
3352 Household appliances 3352 
3353 Electrical equipment 3353 
3359 Other electrical equipment and components 3359 
3361 Motor vehicles and parts 3361 
3361 Motor vehicles 
3362 Motor vehicles and parts 3362 
3362 Motor vehicle bodies and trailers 
3363 Motor vehicles and parts 3363 
3364 Aerospace products and parts 3364 
3365 Railroad rolling stock and other transportation 
 
3365 
3366 Ship and boat building 3366 
3369 Railroad rolling stock and other transportation 
 
3369 
3371 Household and institutional furniture 3371 
3372 Office furniture and fixtures 3372 
3379 Other furniture-related products 3379 
3391 Medical equipment and supplies 3391 










Appendix Table 2a 
SUR Results for the 2007-2017 data  
Aggregate Manufacturing 
Without Imposing Symmetry 
 




























              
US Blue Collar Wages -2.316*** -0.815*** -2.110*** -2.228*** -1.045*** -2.570*** 
 (0.601) (0.295) (0.476) (0.459) (0.227) (0.367) 
Mexican White-Collar Wages 0.376 -0.266 0.622* 0.410 -0.357* 0.441 
 (0.425) (0.208) (0.337) (0.397) (0.196) (0.317) 
Mexican Blue-Collar Wages -0.324 0.092 -1.026*** -0.369 0.210 -0.788** 
 (0.474) (0.232) (0.375) (0.429) (0.212) (0.343) 
Output -0.251 0.655 1.312    
 (1.104) (0.542) (0.875)    
Constant 24.101** 17.515*** 16.729** 21.743*** 23.681*** 29.067*** 
 (10.466) (5.134) (8.291) (1.287) (0.635) (1.029) 
       
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.204 0.413 0.475 0.204 0.406 0.465 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hours are the monthly hours and wages are 
the real dollar-valued hourly wage.  Mexican values are converted with the nominal exchange rate and the U.S. CPI.  
U.S. values are converted to real using the U.S. CPI. 
 
 
Appendix Table 2b: 






U.S. Production Workers-Mexican NonProduction Workers  0.025 0.005 
U.S. Production Workers-Mexican Production Workers  0.007 0.000 
Mexican NonProduction Workers-Mexican Production Workers  0.336 0.651 
Notes: The table contains the results for the test of symmetry.  The null is that the difference between the 
estimated coefficient pairs in each row is equal to zero (i.e. that the coefficients are equal).  P-values below 0.05 
indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% level of confidence.  
